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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper addresses issues of regulatory convergence and Europeanisation as they have developed 
within the agrochemicals sector. Taking the UK as a case study, the paper considers the continuing 
importance of local and national factors within systems that are ostensibly international and 
standardised. In particular, the paper shows how the embedded social relations of regulatory 
science in the UK, including institutional practices, judgements of expertise and established 
relationships of trust, result in a ‘nation-centredness’ and divergence of regulatory cultures despite 
the putative development of a harmonised European framework. It is argued that, as a consequence, 
the claimed universalism of scientific culture in this area is in tension with the local conditions of 
its practice and enactment. 
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REGULATORY SCIENCE, EUROPEANISATION AND THE  
CONTROL OF AGROCHEMICALS 
 
 
The agrochemical market is international in character. Companies wishing to operate across 
national boundaries have typically had to meet a diverse range of regulatory requirements even for 
the same product. The harmonisation of such requirements offers the opportunity of standardising 
these various systems so that approvals (including reviews of old agrochemicals) can be based on 
core sets of data that have wide validity. The twin objectives of these changes are to aid trade by 
creating a level-playing field of regulatory requirements across the EU and to provide a European-
wide standard for the protection of public and occupational health, wildlife and the environment. 
 
In seeking such objectives, the development of international regulatory frameworks places 
particular pressure upon scientific evidence and argumentation. Markets tend to favour 
standardisation for economic reasons. Nevertheless, the actual standards adopted are generally 
legitimated in scientific terms. Scientific evidence and evaluation is seen to offer not only a rational 
basis for harmonisation but also a policy foundation which applies across nations - and in that sense 
is ‘universal’. However, such a generalised treatment of the relationship between science and 
regulation tends to ignore the local negotiations, institutional structures, social relationships and 
professional judgements that lie at the heart of contemporary regulatory science. As we argue here, 
the very notions of ‘standardisation’ and ‘harmonisation’ need to be critically examined in the light 
of arguments from the sociology of scientific knowledge - and especially its empirical analysis of 
modern scientific practice. 
 
In this paper, therefore, we consider the emerging relationship between one national regulatory 
framework and moves towards the construction of a European structure. More particularly, we 
explore the relationship between an area of scientific and innovatory activity which we term 
‘regulatory science’ and attempts to develop a harmonised system for the technical assessment and 
control of agrochemical products. We argue that an empirically-based understanding of the 
contemporary conditions of regulatory scientific production is necessary for the analysis of 
‘Europeanisation’ as a political and scientific process. More particularly, we suggest that the 
conventional legitimation of regulatory harmonisation draws upon an idealised (and, indeed, 
ideological) account of regulatory science and its ‘globalised’ character. 
 
The paper discusses the possible consequences of this empirical analysis for the concept of 
‘Europeanisation’ and, by extension, ‘globalisation’. Although ‘Europeanisation’ is often presented 
as a straightforward process of ‘regulatory convergence’, the pattern is also one of divergence, 
reinforcement of national self-identity and localism - and, as we suggest, for reasons especially 
linked to the contemporary character of scientific practice in this area. Accordingly, European 
regulatory structures cannot simply be imposed in a standardised fashion but must be negotiated 
and constructed within particular institutional settings. 
                                                 
   AUTHOR’S NOTE: This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(award number L323253019). The authors are also grateful for the help and assistance offered 
by the Science Policy Support Group within the ESRC research programme on the European 
Context of UK Science Policy. The authors would like to thank the industry and government 
representatives interviewed for this research, who for reasons of confidentiality remain 
anonymous. The authors would also like to thank Professor Tim O’Riordan for his helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The views expressed in this paper are of course the 
authors’ own. 
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On that basis, our paper begins with a consideration of ‘regulatory science’ in the area of British 
agrochemical development. As we discuss below, regulatory science is contentious in terms of 
academic definition and analysis - not least in its portrayal of the inter-linkage between science, 
regulatory policy and industrial practice. However, we suggest that it does allow significant insight 
into the conditions of contemporary knowledge production. 
 
Having discussed the character of British regulatory science with regard to the agrochemicals 
industry, we then consider the relationship between this and moves towards Europeanisation. In the 
case of agrochemicals, companies have been actively engaged in European regulatory processes 
over the last decade. Our findings suggest that the form of this practical engagement will be, and 
indeed already has been, strongly influenced by the institutional and cognitive organisation of 
regulatory science. 
 
Previous academic studies have noted the difficulties of establishing policy (or ‘achieving closure’) 
within scientific domains that are often characterised by extreme uncertainty and indeterminacy 
(Wynne 1992; Jasanoff 1990; Irwin 1995). In such situations, the demands of certain national 
policy-makers for definitive and scientifically-robust risk assessments have often served only to 
exacerbate scientific disagreements. Regulatory science then emerges as a sometimes problematic 
meeting-ground between the institutional practices and professional expectations of science and of 
policy-making (for a fuller discussion of regulatory science, see Irwin et al 1997). 
 
In general agreement with this conceptualisation, Shackley and Wynne (1995) have argued that 
regulatory science should be seen not just as a ‘sort of hybrid of science and policy’ but as part of a 
larger process of ‘mutual construction’. According to this perspective, ‘science’ and ‘policy’ do not 
simply interact on occasions but instead build upon one other so that political assumptions form a 
key but unacknowledged element within scientific risk assessment, and scientific assessment in 
turn serves to frame policy. Thus, the relationship between science and policy is presented by 
Shackley and Wynne as a ‘material institutional and cultural enterprise’ within which ‘common 
cultural and epistemic commitments may unite policy bodies, scientific researchers and the hybrid 
area in between them’. Rather than simply defining regulatory science by its purpose, we see that it 
can represent a specific set of assumptions and practices. The implication is that - far from offering 
a universal and objectively-determined basis for common standards - regulatory science can vary 
substantially across policy settings and decision-making processes. 
 
In this paper, and broadly in line with Shackley and Wynne’s portrayal, we wish to consider the 
cognitive and organisational characteristics of regulatory science as it has emerged in the area of 
agrochemicals. In order to conduct this analysis, we will approach issues of regulatory science and 
European harmonisation from the perspective of one nation - the United Kingdom (and especially 
industry with a base in the UK). Rather than presenting an international comparative survey, our 
empirical analysis will draw upon one national context as it faces up to the challenges of 
harmonisation. In this way, whilst the paper might serve as a precursor to a more internationally-
based study of regulatory standardisation, it also allows a more specific exploration of the locally-
negotiated conditions of regulatory science. 
 
Our research is based upon an extended series of interviews with industrialists holding special 
responsibility in this area (including toxicology, R&D and regulatory affairs managers) within 
R&D-intensive agrochemical corporations with a base in the UK. As all the major R&D 
agrochemical corporations are multi-nationals, and the agrochemical market is itself international in 
character, these representatives have considerable experience of regulatory systems in Europe and 
the rest of the world. In addition, we have interviewed government officials from the relevant 
- 5 - 
departments and agencies (including the Pesticides Safety Directorate, PSD), officials of the 
European Commission and scientists (working in university and industrial contract laboratories). 
We have also made full use of documentary sources - and especially evidence compiled by the 
House of Commons Agriculture Committee. In order to establish the regulatory background to this 
research, we will now briefly consider the UK structure of the regulation of agrochemicals and of 
regulatory science as these existed prior to the ‘European’ initiatives of the 1990s. 
 
REGULATORY SCIENCE IN THE UK 
 
In the last decade, pesticide regulation in the UK has changed considerably. Until 1986, the UK had 
no statutory regulations for the approval and registration of pesticides. Instead, a voluntary scheme 
known as the Pesticides Safety Precautions Scheme (PSPS) operated between government, 
manufacturers and suppliers. Although there was no enforcement, PSPS operated on the principle 
that only pesticides approved by an independent advisory body, the Advisory Committee on 
Pesticides (ACP), would be supplied. 
 
In 1986, under pressure from the European Community to introduce a statutory scheme, the UK 
replaced PSPS by the Control of Pesticides Regulations (COPR) which legally obliged 
manufacturers to submit data on pesticides to MAFF for expert review. Under this statutory 
scheme, MAFF’s Pesticide Safety Directorate (PSD) administers pesticide registration, the ACP 
makes recommendations on the approval of pesticides, and Ministers formally take approval 
decisions. As will be discussed below, the introduction of statutory regulation stimulated and 
professionalised regulatory compliance activities undertaken by industry and necessitated a 
concomitant expansion of government facilities for reviewing submissions. For example, between 
1986 and 1992, the UK’s Pesticide Safety Directorate (PSD) increased its scientific staff from 25 to 
just over 100 (House of Commons Agriculture Committee 1995, 210). These changes have put the 
UK in a strong position both to accommodate and influence current changes at the European level. 
 
It is in this context that we consider the evolution and character of scientific activity relating to the 
British regulation of agrochemicals. Previous discussions have tended to characterise regulatory 
science either in terms of its social function (informing the regulatory process) or its applied 
content (often in contrast to ‘basic’ or ‘academic’ research).1 Our empirically-based approach, 
using in-depth interviews and associated literature searches, permitted an exploration of the 
relationship between ‘science’ and ‘regulation’ in the specific context of changes in policy-making. 
 
Our research suggests that previous characterisations of regulatory science are too generalised. 
Instead we have identified a diverse range of activities which comprise ‘regulatory science in 
action’ (for a fuller discussion see Irwin et al, 1997). These activities cross the conventional 
boundaries between ‘science’, ‘regulation’ and ‘industrial innovation’, suggesting just how 
mutually embedded they have become within the national context studied here. Thus our notion of 
regulatory science does not simply encompass what might be conventionally defined as ‘science’ 
but also a multifarious range of technical, innovative, legal and administrative activities which 
relate to the development and innovation of agrochemicals. 
 
This is not to deny, however, that there is a ‘scientific’ component to this area - often involving 
what might be conventionally termed as ‘basic’ science but always with a practical application 
ultimately in mind. In this, of course, regulatory science may not be atypical of the wider 
conditions of contemporary knowledge production as supported by industry, government and 
academia.2 Certainly, we would not accept the assertion that regulatory science simply represents 
some ‘applied’ form of basic or academic science - not least since such a dichotomy depends upon 
a Mertonian (or at least pre-Kuhnian) conception of the scientific enterprise. 
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In order to illustrate these points - and also to indicate the range of scientific disciplines and 
specialties, and institutional activities involved - we set out below a number of diverse types of 
regulatory scientific activity as described to us by industrial and governmental representatives. Our 
research especially emphasised the regulatory scientific activities of British companies prior to 
regulatory review. Of course, in public terms this might be only the beginning of a wider scrutiny 
of the technical evidence regarding the safety of a specific agrochemical. 
 
For example, speculative research on subjects that may have regulatory significance (such as 
questions of chemical toxicity or environmental hazard) may seem to be the most ‘academic’ form 
of regulatory science - and certainly university laboratories are involved. However, it is worth 
noting that some research in this area is undertaken by the larger R&D-active agrochemical firms. 
The development and validation of tests for screening chemicals, meanwhile, draws upon more 
diverse institutional bases of government and a small number of academic laboratories, as well as 
the agrochemical industry, contract laboratories and consultancies (in these cases often through 
their involvement in professional associations). 
 
In contrast to such development work, regulatory compliance testing to screen chemicals for 
hazard, is generally repetitive and highly-standardised (with fixed protocols and test procedures 
which must be conducted in accordance with the requirements of Good Laboratory Practice). This 
form of regulatory science is the domain of the agrochemical company developing the pesticide and 
associated contract laboratories, with British university laboratories seldom getting involved. 
However, investigative research, exploring whether positive results from regulatory compliance 
testing are ‘false positives’ or whether special circumstances suggest that results are irrelevant to 
risk assessment, is organised on a more case-by-case basis. This work by its nature tends to be 
rather more research intensive, although it is still largely undertaken in industrial facilities. 
 
Finally, regulatory submission, comprising the completion of the in-house risk assessment and the 
compilation of the dossier of information for regulatory review, is a highly multi-disciplinary 
process combining both technical, regulatory and managerial inputs. Whilst regulatory submission 
is generally a matter for the agrochemical companies themselves - often working closely with 
consultancies and contract laboratories- the relevant British government agency (PSD) may also 
play a role in offering constructive advice and general guidance. 
 
This thumbnail sketch suggests the variety of scientific disciplines and specialties, bureaucratic 
practices and institutions that comprise regulatory science. In institutional terms, it is important to 
note that regulatory scientific activities draw upon a national - but also international - patchwork of 
organisational forms. As we discuss below, this patchwork has developed particularly over the last 
decade or so in response to the changing regulatory framework. In order to explore this patchwork, 
we will focus on regulatory scientific activities from the perspectives of industry, contract 
laboratories and governmental agencies. 
 
For industry, there has over the last decade or so been a move towards taking greater account of 
regulatory demands within the development of new agrochemicals. According to one regulatory 
affairs manager, prior to the introduction of statutory approval requirements registration “was 
almost a part-time occupation of a [field] trials officer.” However, the introduction of statutory 
registration in 1986 forced companies to strengthen and professionalise their regulatory compliance 
activities. As another company representative put it to us, “we found a successful family of Active 
Ingredients and invested quite heavily, but we then came up against a problem which killed it. We 
realised we could no longer afford to do safety tests at the end - so now we run the tests in parallel.” 
Whereas previously testing could be ‘bolted-on’ at the end of the innovation process, the possibility 
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of costly registration failures necessitated a general move by agrochemical companies to integrate 
regulatory compliance testing into the innovation process. 
 
Increasing innovation costs and lead-times to market have become critical in determining the 
eventual profitability of a pesticide. Screening-out potentially efficacious but unregisterable Active 
Ingredients (AIs) by routinely testing them at well-defined stages in their development has, 
therefore, become an integral part of the agrochemical innovation process. Termed ‘process 
orientation’ by industry, this organisation of regulatory scientific activities appears to represent a 
new stance in industrial scientific work. 
 
The process orientation of regulatory compliance work generally involves a multi-disciplinary team 
which integrates scientists with other sections of companies, such as marketing, throughout the 
innovation process. This has resulted in scientists, pre-eminently toxicologists - although 
increasingly also ecotoxicologists as environmental issues rise up the regulatory agenda - having 
enhanced responsibilities for decision-making over the continuance or termination of projects. 
Innovation and regulation are indeed becoming more closely related in this sector - and mainly 
through the changing role and organisational location of regulatory expertise within companies. 
 
According to our interviews, such innovation processes rely on an extended network of 
relationships between industry, contract laboratories and agency staff. For example, external 
contract laboratories, which are primarily used for regulatory compliance testing, have to be trusted 
to provide reliable scientific services. Indeed, one industrial expert referred to such laboratories as 
“extensions” of their own industrial facilities. For contract laboratories to gain such trust, both 
technical competence and in-depth knowledge of regulatory requirements are required. Where the 
contract laboratories undertake work close to regulatory submission, it can also require informal 
knowledge in terms of judging how regulations will be interpreted and applied. Thus, considerable 
value is placed upon good relationships between industry, contract laboratories and the PSD. 
Furthermore, several interviewees from industry and contract laboratories observed that regular 
dialogue with the government agency was critical in negotiating the fulfilment of regulatory 
requirements. 
 
This institutional network is reinforced by its relatively small and informal character - so that the 
key regulatory science actors know each other by name. In Britain, for example, a number of 
people have moved from government positions to industry. Equally, there are fewer than ten R&D-
active companies with a base in Britain, an equivalent number of larger contract laboratories and, in 
PSD, a high-profile government agency. Given the intensity of discussions within this small world 
and the perceived unity of purpose, it is hardly surprising that close personal links should have 
developed over time. Indeed, as one representative of a contract organisation with prior government 
experience observed, “industry uses us because they know if a problem develops we can get on the 
phone... it’s about trust building.” 
 
It is also a noteworthy feature of the British regulatory system that the relevant governmental 
agency has a role in regulatory submission. This is not to suggest that civil servants are 
bureaucratically involved in making submissions. However, they can be involved in an informal 
way, advising on the form, and perhaps even the content, of regulatory submissions - for example, 
by discussing the suitability of applications with agrochemical companies prior to review. Indeed, 
one PSD official put it to us that the agency sees its relationship with industry as co-operative and 
inter-dependent in character: as “two sides of same coin.” He considered that the relationship 
between the agency and industry has been helped by industry’s recognition of the “need for their 
registration officers to be far more professionally orientated.” The PSD, for example, is “happy to 
talk to people who are new to regulatory departments in industry and tell them what we are about 
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and how we go about things, what we expect of them, and hopefully get a better idea of what they 
expect of us.” Similarly, industry has viewed positively the way that the PSD has evolved in its 
implementation of the statutory regime. 
 
Within British industry, the ‘hands-on’ style of the PSD is positively contrasted with the ‘hands-
off’ approach of certain other countries. One European regulatory affairs manager we interviewed 
was particularly struck by what he described as PSD’s “willingness to register compounds rather 
than stop them” - a point expressed in terms of a direct contrast with the Scandinavian and US 
systems. 
 
This does not imply that the relationship between industry and PSD has always been easy. In 
particular, the introduction of statutory regulation in 1986 inevitably changed the relationship 
between government and industry introducing less flexibility and more bureaucracy. As one 
consultant to the agrochemical industry put it, “I can think of instances where [pre-statutory 
regulation] we put in for limited approval for a thousand acres and the Ministry guy would say we 
can’t possibly allow this, will you accept a tenth of that?... and we couldn’t possibly do that so he 
would offer us twenty per cent. It was this sort of thing which now just wouldn’t happen.” 
Particularly problematic for industry were the delays introduced into the approval system as the 
Ministry struggled to cope with the massively increased and accumulating backlog of work (House 
of Commons Agriculture Committee 1995, 77). This was only overcome by the rapid expansion of 
PSD over the following years, culminating in the establishment of PSD as an agency in 1993. This 
intensification of governmental activity has effectively transformed the PSD into what might be 
termed a ‘regulatory science institution’. 
 
Staff training has been critical in this expansion, with the PSD considering that it takes around 18 
months to turn a graduate (usually recent) into a ‘regulatory scientist’ acquainted with a number of 
fields of science, law and agriculture (House of Commons Agriculture Committee 1995, 211). Even 
so, the heavy workload has placed such pressure on the PSD that it has been unable to cope fully 
with the review of dossier submissions. In order to meet this demand, it has contracted out some 
reviews to external organisations, representing a partial privatisation of regulatory functions (House 
of Commons Agriculture Committee 1995, 46). This could be seen as further tying PSD and 
external contract organisations into a close institutional network. 
 
Whilst the focus of this discussion has been on the relationship between PSD and industry, it 
should be noted that recommendations on the registration of a novel AI are made by the Advisory 
Committee on Pesticides. From the perspective of industry this can cause uncertainty, for as one 
senior industrial regulatory affairs manager put it to us, “I think largely that they [the PSD] will 
know how the ACP is likely to react..., but it’s still never a cut and dried case. You know the ACP 
still have the independence to say ‘No I’m sorry, we don’t agree with that’, and it still does 
happen.” However, his perception was that over the last ten years or so “there is a better 
understanding and a better working relationship” between the PSD and ACP. 
 
In institutional terms, therefore, regulatory science in the area of agrochemicals represents a 
patchwork of activities which are generally - at least in the British context - tied together by 
relations of expert knowledge, trust and mutual understanding. This seems especially true of the 
linkage between industry officials, government representatives and contract laboratories. In 
scientific and technical terms, these institutional arrangements are frequently legitimated by the 
expressed need to proceed rationally and sensibly through an area of some complexity and 
indeterminacy. The particularly hybrid and interdisciplinary nature of regulatory scientific activities 
reinforces this sense of collegiality. 
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However, and very importantly, it is in the character of such an overlapping patchwork that not all 
possible participants are included. In particular, the position of NGOs deserves some attention in 
this regard. The scope for UK NGOs to participate in the development of regulatory science was 
widely considered by industry and government officials to be limited. This position was defended 
on the grounds that NGOs were not seen as possessing the resources to undertake regulatory 
scientific work of their own nor to develop the very specialised expertise needed to shape debate. 
Their activity was seen to be most appropriately confined to lobbying around the general goals of 
the new regulatory regime and the resolution of certain specific regulatory issues. The contrast with 
the position of industry in terms of the possibilities both for overt and more subtle influence seems 
quite clear. Thus, the character of regulatory science has major implications for discussion over the 
possible extent of ‘public participation’. 
 
In summary, alongside the growth of regulatory science have come changes in the management of 
intramural research and the development of specialised contracting and consultancy facilities. 
Moreover, the particular character of this national setting has encouraged the growth of cross-
institutional links and informal relations. Yet whilst regulatory evolution in the UK has resulted in 
a close professionalised network between industry and government with an emphasis on mutual 
understanding, moves towards European harmonisation present new uncertainties. As one senior 
regulatory affairs manager put it to us in 1996, there are “not usually now too many surprises” in 
submitting a pesticide for approval in the UK, but “what is a complete unknown quantity at the 
moment is what happens when you take 15 PSDs, bolt them together and give them score cards. I 
mean to me that is a big worry.” 
 
The question raised by regulatory moves towards Europeanisation, and which we can now address 
directly, concerns the relationship between this local and national network, and newly-emerging 
trans-national systems. How flexible is this national system likely to be in the face of such moves 
towards harmonisation? In particular, what will regulatory change mean for the institutional 
patchwork described here? Put differently, are the local conditions of scientific and institutional 
practice likely to be simply swept aside by such ‘globalised’ initiatives - or will localism maintain 
significance within this new setting? 
 
EUROPEAN HARMONISATION AND UK REGULATORY SCIENCE 
 
An enormous variety of agrochemical products is marketed across Europe. Harmonising these 
diverse authorisations is complex as agrochemicals vary in their efficacy, safety and environmental 
impact dependent upon regional agricultural, ecological and plant health conditions. In order to 
deal with this diversity, the new European regulatory regime retains national dimensions of 
approval that, according to the Commission, strike a balance between the need of the Single Market 
for ‘central judgement and control’ and for ‘local decisions’ to meet regional conditions (Scharpe 
1992, 97). 
 
Accordingly, the European Union’s Plant Protection Product Directive 91/414/EEC (Council of the 
European Communities, 1991) has been designed as a two-tier approval system. Whilst Active 
Ingredients (AIs) - the molecules responsible for the action of pesticides - will be authorised at the 
European level (using a rapporteur system), particular agrochemical products will be authorised at 
the level of Member States. However, data requirements and evaluation guidelines will be common 
throughout the EU, subject to modification on the basis of regional ecological variation. Given this 
proviso, Member States will be expected to abide by centralised and commonly-agreed approvals 
of Active Ingredients, and to mutually recognise each other’s approval of agrochemical products. 
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The new European system, therefore, is an attempt at standardising practice across Europe. 
Common data requirements and common standards of production, evaluation and interpretation of 
data are crucial to the success of the regime. By harmonising Member States’ regulatory traditions 
and requirements, pesticide companies will no longer have to apply to each individual country for 
approval. This is attractive to business as less repetitious testing will be required to satisfy each 
national market. However, the standardisation of testing has also created a more rigorous European 
regime: there has been an expansion of the range of testing, particularly in the increasingly 
politically-sensitive fields of ecotoxicity and environmental fate. 
 
From the point of view of the UK, and indeed of other Member States, there will be a long 
transition from national systems to a fully European system (see, for example, the evidence of the 
British Agrochemicals Association to the House of Commons Agriculture Committee 1995, 82). 
The extent to which the implementation of this regime impacts on Member States will also depend 
at least in part upon the state of existing regimes. For some European countries, in particular those 
in Southern Europe, the new regime will represent a considerable change in policy and procedure. 
For others with longer-established regulatory systems, predominantly in Northern Europe, the 
transition is likely to be less radical in character. This paper now considers this transition from the 
perspective of the UK - and, especially, how this transition is being conceptualised from the 
perspective of key regulatory scientific actors as they consider the new regime. 
 
Based on the brief discussion so far of agrochemicals, steps towards European harmonisation 
appear to be founded on two premises. The first is that scientific principles are common - 
transcendent even - and therefore valid throughout Europe. In similar environmental conditions, 
what is safe for Germans will be safe for the Portuguese, and so on. Second, the technical reliability 
of scientific producers means that a test or trial competently carried out in one Member State 
should have validity elsewhere. The universality of science is the basis on which tests performed in 
a French toxicological laboratory can satisfy the regulatory authorities in Athens and Copenhagen. 
 
As described so far, however, our research suggests that regulatory science - at least in the UK 
context - is an activity institutionally and organisationally embedded within national regulatory and 
industrial systems. Within our interviews, we especially focused upon the issues for UK regulatory 
science raised by the development of European systems. In this context, a number of characteristics 
of the UK system were seen as especially valuable to participants but also as potentially in tension 
with the globalised ethos of Europeanisation. 
 
Our interviews, for example, highlight the current dependence of regulatory science on a relatively-
small number of participants drawn especially from industry and the regulatory authorities. One 
recurrent theme within our interviews was that key respondents from different companies, contract 
research laboratories and the regulatory authority generally knew each other personally, had often 
sat together on various committees or may even have worked at some point for the same 
organisation. None of this is too surprising within such a small and highly-specialised world. The 
value of maintaining established personal links was emphasised by one regulatory affairs manager 
who observed that, “we know pretty well now what to expect... But then you end up with someone 
new at PSD who suddenly starts wanting to know things that you previously took for granted 
because of the relationship you had with the predecessor who accepted and understood.” In the 
wider European context, industrial respondents saw such problems as being inevitably exacerbated. 
 
Relationships between these participants have developed over time - often being based on a sense 
of trust and locally-negotiated understanding. Whilst it was, for example, considered to be 
important to get routine testing work done in a cost-effective manner, it was essential also that 
contractors could deliver high-quality research and offer associated advice and support. From the 
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perspective of contract laboratories, reputation within the industry was seen to be crucial - a point 
made all the more important by the publicly-sensitive nature of the animal testing involved (a 
sensitivity which tended to bring the key participants together in mutual defence).3 Once again, 
even among companies with a strong international orientation, there was concern about the 
maintenance of such trust relationships within an apparently ‘impersonal’ regulatory system. 
 
Indeed, the well-established nature of these embedded institutional relations of regulatory science 
suggests a definite limit to harmonisation. In addition to the previously-discussed case of NGOs, a 
number of interviewees considered that this close institutional network meant that organisations 
less-well connected to the agency, in particular little-known (within the UK) foreign laboratories, 
will be less attractive both to industry and regulator. Without the ‘insider’ knowledge of institutions 
already keyed into the industrial-governmental networks described above, overseas laboratories 
were considered to have greater problems in negotiating and meeting regulatory requirements as 
perceived by the UK, than UK-based or well-renowned organisations. 
 
Also important is the relationship between the particular British policy style and the development 
of knowledge in this area. The UK approach has characteristically been built on shared learning 
(constrained, of course, by commercial secrecy). Trade organisations (such as the British 
Agrochemicals Association, BAA) have worked particularly to this purpose. Whilst it would be an 
exaggeration to suggest that this leads to total agreement across the industry about key technical 
principles, our discussion with one important cross-industry committee (within the BAA structure) 
did suggest an agreement at least on the regulatory agenda and on the issues which required 
resolution. This sense of common purpose extends to the characteristic British pragmatic 
acceptance of the need for all parties (including regulators) to ‘learn by doing’. Regulatory 
scientists in industry praised the PSD’s preparedness to draw lessons and adapt practice in the light 
of experience - a process which crucially, included the experience of industry. 
 
In contrast, there is much discussion of other countries’ perceived ‘regulatory styles’. For example, 
although other national agencies might consider that they are implementing the legislation 
effectively, our industrial respondents were concerned that problems were arising due to the more 
‘hands-off’ or even disorganised approach of some Member States. As one put it, “The Germans 
have said effectively don’t bother us for the time being until we have our house in order... [and] we 
talked to the French who said they hadn’t a clue how to handle it at the Euro level.” 
 
Closely allied to these contextually-related points, is the importance of professional judgement 
within the conduct of regulatory science. As was pointed out to us on various occasions, regulatory 
science has to operate in the ‘real world’ of commercial development and the specific conditions of 
pesticide usage. The technical culture was, therefore, one that emphasised practicality and 
pragmatism over hypothetical scenarios and unrealistic expectations. The Directive makes 
provision for some flexibility in data requirements and the British participants prided themselves on 
implementing a suitably pragmatic and workable system. This was contrasted, for example, with 
observations about the German approach. One regulatory affairs manager who had worked with a 
German-based agrochemical company described the German tradition as “essentially box-ticking... 
quite often you’d do studies which were totally irrelevant for the regulatory decision because you 
just had to fill that box. ...German companies do not feel too comfortable if there are big areas of 
the package left to expert judgement.” 
 
The inter-disciplinary and ‘hybrid’ nature of the field both in terms of the complex ecological 
pathways being considered (covering a whole range of human, animal and environmental effects) 
and the range of disciplines being drawn upon, also creates some problems for moves towards 
supra-national regulatory frameworks. The somewhat distant relationship with academic 
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departments suggested that expertise in regulatory science was largely constrained to the small 
group of actors within the regulatory patchwork and has not generally been institutionalised within 
an established teaching programme or academic research centre which covers all of these questions. 
This absence of institutionalisation makes the call for standardisation especially problematic. 
 
Inextricably linked with these institutional points, respondents raised a number of specific and 
explicit scientific concerns about the new regime. These concerns related particularly to the 
perception that the new European system would deny the importance of contextual variability but 
instead impose a ‘rule-book’ form of standardisation. Such an approach to standardisation was seen 
as the very antithesis of good regulatory scientific practice. These concerns covered a range of 
issues. 
 
For example, concerns were expressed that the tiered approach towards testing in the case of 
beneficial insects was overly cautious. The tiered approach sets out a number of levels of testing, 
but an AI only progresses onto the next level if it fails to pass a previous one. However, as one 
industry representative commented, “Some of the triggers seem too conservative so that the tiered 
approach is never an option - you will always go from one tier to the next. We might have 
situations where we say why on earth do we have to do this? We are developing insecticides which 
kill insects!” 
 
In another case, a regulatory affairs manager described how the German authorities brought in a 
new requirement to study volatilisation of a pesticide. “Effectively you had to spray a load of dwarf 
French beans and then take them down a wind tunnel and blast air at them, I mean it was so crazy, 
the whole concept, but it had never been discussed with industry. Unfortunately that data 
requirement has now been sort of copied into the European legislation so in a sense we are all 
caught up in that.” 
 
Nevertheless, and whilst British-based respondents expressed concerns over the attempted 
standardisation of technical requirements within the new European regime, the perception of both 
industrial and governmental respondents was that the UK had played a leading role in the 
development of the European regime. Indeed, our research suggests that issues of national 
regulatory science are not simply important in terms of responding to European regulatory systems 
but also represent a subtle influence over the design of regulatory requirements. 
 
Having gone through its own regulatory upheavals in the 1980s, the UK has been well-placed to 
understand and influence the European regulatory agenda. According to a PSD representative, the 
PSD has been “playing a major role in the development of the procedures and ideas with Europe, 
based very much on our own experience in the UK following the implementation of legislation.” 
This influence has been reinforced by the involvement of the UK in a series of pilot registrations 
designed to resolve uncertainties about how some of the scientific and, in particular, 
ecotoxicological issues were to be addressed. The establishment of some of the regime’s operating 
principles in this way suggests again that regulation cannot just be formally set but must also be 
defined and interpreted within the processes of its implementation. Industry’s perception of this 
process was that PSD’s ‘hands-on’ approach made the UK an especially-strong player within the 
eventual regime. In that way, it was not considered to be a case of locally-established networks 
‘reacting’ to a European regime but also of these networks influencing the character of ‘universal’ 
regulatory systems. 
 
Furthermore, our research revealed the subtle role of industry in influencing the European regime. 
Critics of the agrochemical and (using parallel arguments) the pharmaceutical industry have in the 
past highlighted the extent to which firms seek to manipulate regulatory environments to favour 
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their particular products. However, our findings suggest the ethos of reasonable and practicable 
regulation may feed forward from agrochemical companies into the design of regulations through 
the advice and activities of professional organisations within which companies are well-
represented. 
 
For example, one industrial toxicologist explained to us how his large multi-national corporation 
neither organised their research to respond to nor anticipate regulations since they were “actively 
involved in the development of regulations.” This was primarily through the European Crop 
Protection Association expert committees that have helped develop various testing strategies. Even 
in the case of the toxicology guidelines, the perception of industry was that, whilst not all of 
industry’s comments were taken on board, “most of them were.” 
 
Of course, the boundary between this ‘feeding forward’ process and lobbying can be extremely 
fine. For example, in the absence of established test guidelines on beneficial arthropods, industry 
was concerned that the Commission might adopt the German system which it saw as complex and 
excessively cautious. Industry therefore set up the Beneficial Arthropods in Registration Testing 
group (BART) in order to produce a new set of guidelines. BART co-organised a conference (with 
EC funding) which involved experts from a range of backgrounds. The test guidelines produced are 
now utilised by the EC (Barrett et al 1994). The point here is that established organisations can play 
a leading role in the development of the regime through the de facto provision of expertise. 
 
In all of these areas, the development of standardised procedures was seen by industry as 
commercially advantageous but also problematic for the conduct of regulatory science. On the one 
hand, the established and locally-negotiated conditions and practices of regulatory science in the 
UK were seen as being threatened by the creation of a standardised regime, and as presenting 
barriers to its implementation. On the other hand, the perception of the UK’s influence over the 
character of the regime mitigated some of the concerns of our UK-based industrial respondents, as 
indeed did their perception that industry itself had played, and will continue to play, its own 
influential role. The character of the European regime was therefore perceived by our industrial and 
governmental respondents to be influenced by a variety of nationally- and organisationally-based 
practices, capabilities and agendas. As discussed below, our research suggests that these 
perceptions can have practical consequences for the way the regime is evolving and for the 
changing character of regulatory science in this area. 
 
REGULATORY SCIENCE, UNIVERSALITY AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
 
The general differentiations that our industrial respondents perceived regarding the respective roles 
and merits of different Member States present industry with a number of dilemmas concerning 
future regulatory submissions. For example, issues of universality across Europe are highlighted in 
the choice of country for the approval of Active Ingredients. Whilst the regime presupposes that the 
choice of Member State to act as rapporteur is essentially an irrelevance (since all are assumed to 
be working to the same set of technical requirements), there is some evidence that a number of 
technical and institutional factors may influence the choice of rapporteur country. The UK was seen 
as attractive to our UK-based industrial respondents, both because of their familiarity with the 
regulators and also because of the perception that the UK had sufficient capabilities. As one senior 
regulatory affairs manager observed, “The UK has probably got the best understanding of what the 
new process will look like in the future... because their system is closest to the new system. They 
are the leaders at the moment on the process.” 
 
Connected to this point, our industrial respondents were also concerned about the quality of review. 
Choice of country may, for example, bestow a certain status and integrity upon the AI (with certain 
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nations being seen to carry more regulatory weight than others). Equally, some industrial 
interviewees were concerned that their submissions might be sent to less well-equipped 
(particularly Southern European) Member States for review - as one respondent put it, they are “not 
tooled up to do the job.” 
 
In considering the choice of Member States for reviewing a submission, industrial respondents 
were also concerned about differing Member States’ views on pesticide usage. In particular they 
were concerned about submitting applications to Member States less favourably disposed to 
pesticide usage. One senior regulatory affairs manager, for example, commented that, “Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have a lot of young and not so young scientists who believe 
that crop protection products are, well, not the best things to have around, or at least when they are 
necessary they must be reduced to a minimum.”  
 
At the same time, our industrial respondents also pointed out a number of issues that will directly 
influence the process of mutual recognition. For example, from a practical point of view there was 
seen to be little point in submitting an AI for review to a Member State where it had no uses. 
However, there was considerable concern that in other cases where pesticide products would have 
wider applicability, Member States may not choose to mutually recognise each other’s approvals of 
products. It was regularly pointed out to us that there was considerable scope for a Member State to 
use ecological variation as grounds for objecting to the approval of a pesticide product that had 
been approved by another Member State. The calculation for agrochemical companies was made 
more complex by the perception that Northern European Member States were less likely to accept 
the evaluations of Southern European Member States than vice versa. As one industrial expert has 
described it, mutual recognition ‘takes you beyond the science of regulatory affairs. It takes you 
into an area of trust: one Member State has to trust the decision of another Member State’ (House 
of Commons Agriculture Committee 1995, 90). 
 
These dilemmas for industry have been exacerbated by what our respondents saw as attempts by 
Member States to manipulate the system so as to support their own indigenous regulatory scientific 
infrastructure (or at least to ensure that other countries do not receive ‘undue’ support). Several 
industrial interviewees, for example, suggested that the French authorities were exploiting the size 
of the French Market by informally attempting to insist that they be chosen as rapporteur for the 
approval of AIs with a potential use in France. Furthermore, the French authorities were informally 
suggesting that efficacy data be generated in France according to their own methods. As one field 
trials expert put it candidly, it was a case of ‘jobs for the boys’. 
 
The choice of country to evaluate an AI is further complicated by the move across Europe towards 
the devolvement of governmental agencies such as the UK’s Pesticide Safety Directorate (PSD). As 
there is no harmonised fee structure for approvals, there is considerable variability in charges 
across the European Union: from the PSD which operates full cost recovery, to other agencies 
which may charge no fee. For new AIs this may only be a very minor part of the total costs of 
innovating a new AI, but for old AIs in review this can be a more substantial cost (House of 
Commons Agriculture Committee 1995, 92-93). 
 
These considerations raise the interesting possibility of the development of a market in approvals, 
with the PSD adopting an entrepreneurial stance, looking for regulatory business within a European 
context. Whilst fees charged and ‘customer service’ (e.g. efficiency, accessibility) would provide 
one element within this ‘market’, another would be the perceived status and credibility of national 
agencies (as viewed, for example, by non-European authorities). Clearly the PSD considers itself 
well-placed in this regard given its involvement in the development of the European regime. 
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Issues such as these have been implicitly recognised by the Commission. For example, it has taken 
on the power to reallocate the rapporteur country if one Member State appears to be taking on a 
disproportionate number of reviews. It has also instituted a system of co-rapporteurs whereby less 
established authorities can call upon their more experienced counterparts in evaluating AIs (House 
of Commons Agriculture Committee 1995, 57). The extent to which these moves will be able to 
resolve both the concerns of Member States and industry, however, is unclear.  
 
In part, therefore, a European political economy of generating regulatory requirements, producing 
data and undertaking evaluations can be identified as evolving in the harmonised regime. This 
tendency is further reinforced by established national relations of familiarity and trust. The 
argument here is that the production of regulatory science is not a universalistic practice but is 
heavily contextualised within the institutional social-relations resulting from (and helping create) 
regulation. 
 
What should also be very apparent from the previous discussion is that, whilst scientific 
universality is presented as a powerful legitimation for mutual recognition and for ‘globalised’ 
regulatory systems, scientific requirements are actually interpreted and actively made sense of 
within these social, political and institutional settings. Here, we have highlighted such processes 
from the particular perspective of one nation. Of course, it seems reasonable to speculate that other 
nations will follow similar forms of interpretation and ‘sense-making’ as they also try to anticipate, 
interpret and shape new regulatory regimes. Our point is not to present the UK case as either unique 
or typical. Instead, we wish to suggest them generally-unacknowledged cultural and institutional 
dynamics at work within what are often presented by policy-makers as ‘global’ and centrally-
driven processes. 
 
In the UK case, one illustration of such interpretative processes is provided by the continued 
significance of national regulatory committees such as those within the British Agrochemicals 
Association structure. Indeed, the government agency may in fact now have an augmented rather 
than diminished role as a consequence of European changes. In such ways, standardisation may 
actually reinforce local and national negotiations rather than rendering them meaningless. At the 
same time, and despite the universal claims of science, the character of regulatory science continues 
to demand contextual interpretation and situation-specific modifications - and for reasons which go 
beyond the obvious requirements of ecological variation across Member States. Whilst ecological 
variation is conventionally framed as a ‘technical’ issue, our research suggests the inseparability of 
‘technical’ from social and institutional factors (as when ecological variation is used as grounds for 
blocking products already approved elsewhere). Contextual variation is, therefore, as much a 
‘social’ as a ‘scientific’ phenomenon. 
 
In policy terms, we encounter a question of balance between ‘centralised’ and ‘localised’ systems 
and the most effective relationship between these. However, this is not just a matter of institutional 
relations but also of the scientific assumptions which underpin these. Whilst European initiatives 
draw upon a ‘universal’ account of science, British regulatory scientists typically emphasise the 
judgemental, case-by-case and pragmatic application of science - indeed, a requirement for local 
flexibility and interpretation seems central to the whole ethos of UK regulatory science. Each 
approach claims to be ‘scientific’ - but actually interprets this in very different ways. At the heart of 
this standardised system, therefore, there is an active set of negotiations over the desirability, 
practicability and scientific legitimacy of ‘universal’ requirements. At this point, Waterton and 
Wynne’s discussion of the scientific and cultural dimensions of European environmental policy 
becomes highly-relevant: 
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‘Perhaps the key question is whether what is lacking is skill in finding a supposedly ‘correct’ level 
of standardisation in such information and data, or whether the very idea of a singular optimal 
point, on a range from complete standardisation to complete localisation, is itself illusory. Instead, 
perhaps, one might look for a policy culture and institutions in which discourses of ‘natural’ 
universality or standardisation can coexist and interleave constructively with discourses of ‘natural’ 
local variety’ (Waterton and Wynne 1996, 436). 
 
In the case of agrochemical regulation, it is still premature to conclude how this balance will 
operate. It seems likely, however, that the kinds of negotiation and intervention which have already 
taken place between British industry and ‘Brussels’ will produce a less stark dichotomy than was 
the case with the CORINE environmental information system discussed by Waterton and Wynne. 
Nevertheless, our study has highlighted the potential points of conflict which lie ahead and also the 
underlying tensions between the stated rationale for policy-making and its local re-negotiation and 
re-construction. It seems safe to conclude even from this single-nation case-study that 
‘standardisation’ is not simply a question of agreeing upon the ‘rules of the game’. It also 
represents a more complex institutional and scientific challenge to the flexibility and 
responsiveness of existing processes. Whilst UK-based industry and governmental officials are 
willing to undertake this challenge (and indeed consider themselves to have little choice), the 
consequences of this are unlikely to be as straightforward as would be indicated by the simple 
metaphor of a ‘level playing-field’. 
 
CONCLUSION: SCIENCE, LOCALISM AND UNIVERSALISM 
 
One possible response to the discussion so far is that it suggests only the predictable teething 
troubles of a move from national to international systems. Equally, it can be argued that such a 
transition raises institutional and political problems but will have no consequences for the character 
of scientific evidence and argumentation. Based on our interviews with key governmental and 
industrial officials, however, it seems clear that British networks will not be swept aside by 
centralised initiatives towards Europeanisation. Instead, we would predict that local institutional 
arrangements will continue to play an important role. In this, our case-study suggests the 
continuing significance of local social and technical relations within globalised regulatory systems. 
Talk of ‘Europeanisation’ consistently fails to recognise these points of tension and their scientific 
implications. From our perspective, globalisation cannot ignore the local conditions of application 
and implementation - and for cultural reasons which appear unlikely to be eradicated or swept 
aside. At the same time, we would suggest that the issues raised in this paper are not ‘merely’ 
matters of institutional politics or national prejudices - instead they play a constitutive role within 
the interpretation, negotiation and reconstruction of scientific evidence. 
 
Accordingly, a number of immediate and empirically-based conclusions can be drawn from our 
discussion of the European framework for the regulation of agrochemicals. Firstly, Europeanisation 
goes along with difference (Yearley 1996; Abraham and Charlton 1995). Moves towards 
standardisation can serve to re-emphasise the significance of local mechanisms for interpretation 
and implementation. Far from the system simply becoming more impersonal and, in that sense, 
‘bureaucratised’ (or even ‘globalised’) as a result of Europeanisation, the increased complexity 
appears also to be re-emphasising existing relations of trust and familiarity. 
 
Secondly, the importance of these local negotiations is downplayed by academic and policy 
approaches that simply focus on the business of standard-setting rather than standard-enactment. 
Our empirical evidence suggests a subtle and diverse series of negotiations (notably, between the 
British agency and the industry) concerning ‘what regulatory requirements really mean’. Rather 
than simply assuming that regulatory standards are readily ‘exportable’ across institutional and 
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national boundaries, our research suggests the active processes of ‘sense-making’ that are 
necessarily involved. 
 
Thirdly, and closely linked to this point, it is generally claimed by regulatory institutions that 
science is universalistic in such contexts but, as we have seen, it is subject to various local 
negotiations and expressions of professional judgement. Test results do not simply ‘speak for 
themselves’ but must instead be interpreted and contextualised. Within our study, for example, this 
leads to regular discussions of the ‘significance’ of test data but also the claim from industry that 
what is required is scientific discretion rather than bureaucratic ‘box-ticking’.  
 
Fourthly, and most specifically, regulatory science represents not just an area of partial (or 
temporary) overlap between ‘science’ and ‘policy’ but has its own - albeit heterogeneous - 
institutional and technical practices. These in turn have a major impact on the conduct of 
harmonisation and standardisation processes across a range of national contexts. We have noted 
especially the significance of existing ‘patchworks’ of regulatory science for the enactment of the 
UK approach to European regulations. We have also suggested that such local processes can 
influence the shape of ‘universal’ regulatory systems (especially, as in the British case, when these 
local conditions have already reached a reasonable stage of development). 
 
In sum, though ‘Europeanisation’ is commonly presented as a story of harmonisation, this research 
project suggests that Europeanisation is accompanied by divergence and differentiation. Our 
working hypothesis based on this UK evidence is that common European regulations are 
configured differently in different national contexts and that attempts to produce uniformity 
ironically bring new differences to the fore. While science appears to offer a universal language 
(and is presented as such to support ‘harmonised’ policy initiatives), it also reinforces the 
significance of existing local arrangements and institutional relations. 
 
Considering this empirical evidence in more general terms, it would appear to follow that both 
analysts and policy-makers need to deal cautiously with the concept of ‘Europeanisation’. This is 
not, of course, to deny the potential practical significance of European moves in this area - these are 
clearly being taken seriously by industry and the regulatory authorities. Instead, we have drawn 
attention to the distinction between what may be claimed for this form of Europeanisation and what 
may be achieved in the short term - an issue which, at least in the regulatory context, has been 
insufficiently explored but which may be crucial. 
  
These issues of localism and universalism, and of sameness and difference, have a potentially wider 
significance for the analysis of modern scientific practice - especially when taken alongside the 
heterogeneous network of ‘knowledge producers’ encountered within regulatory science. Rather 
than being specific to discussions of chemical regulation, these themes and issues may suggest one 
part of a larger process of knowledge development, accreditation and implementation as it is taking 
place across new institutional forms and changing contexts. In that way, standardisation represents 
an important form not simply of ‘technology transfer’ but of a broader ‘knowledge transfer’ (of a 
kind which involves not just specific technologies and bodies of scientific knowledge but also 
technical practices, legal interpretations, social assumptions and professional/institutional 
understandings). 
 
Thus, regulatory science may not represent a deviation from the established worlds of ‘science’ and 
‘policy’ (as it is still often presented) but instead one example of changing knowledge relations and 
the emergence of new networks of knowledge users and producers (Gibbons et al 1994). This final 
conclusion leads into a wider consideration of standardisation as an important case-study for the 
‘sociology of knowledge transfer’. Whilst the sociology of scientific knowledge has long 
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considered the social and technical negotiations which relate to the replicability of, for example, 
scientific experiments (see, for example, Collins 1985), the international standardisation of 
regulatory science potentially opens up more complex issues for the ‘exportability’ of technical 
practices across social and institutional contexts. The study of agrochemicals offered here 
represents one contribution to this emerging area of sociological and STS-based inquiry. 
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NOTES 
 
1  For a general review of regulatory science, see Irwin et al, 1997. 
 
2 A point discussed, for example, by Ravetz some 25 years ago in his discussion of 
‘industrialised science’. See Ravetz 1973. 
 
3 This point was emphasised towards the end of our research by a TV documentary that 
included contentious footage of dog testing smuggled out of one of the major contract laboratories. 
Such incidents are seen to bring adverse public attention to the industry as a whole. 
